Different Shades of Blue: Interwar Air Power Doctrine Development Part 2: Air Power, Doctrine and the Anglo-American Approach

Introduction
This is the second in a series of two articles. Part I1 examined the emergence of aerospace doctrine between the wars and the Anglo-American approach to its development. This part looks at the same issue from the perspective of the United States (US) and Britain’s major aerospace  opponents during the war: Germany and Japan.

The German Approach Like England, Germany had ended World War I with a substantial body of air power experience across all possible roles and missions. In fact, German bombing missions against London led to the creation of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Although Germany, as a defeated nation, was
denied an air force by the Treaty of Versailles, this did not stop the development of air power doctrine. Under the guidance of Generaloberst Hans von Seeckt, the commander of the muchreduced
post-war army, Germany was the only major World War I combatant to undertake a systematic study of wartime aviation. Theycame to the conclusion that the first task for an air force would be to establish air superiority, after which missions in support of the army and against the enemy’s rear areas could be flown. These missions were primarily offensive in nature thus making the bomber the most important type of aircraft.2 German army doctrine focused a combined-arms approach to combat in which a mix of infantry, artillery, tanks, cavalry and aircraft were applied to the mission at hand. To provide air power input a small air staff provided the theoretical work while practical
considerations were explored at a secret base at Lipetsk in the Soviet Union. According to James Corum and Richard Muller, it was generally accepted that once Germany rearmed the Luftwaffe would be a separate service, while the air staff accepted as a matter of course that a large portion of the air force would be dedicated to supporting the army.3 Therefore, unlike their Anglo-American counterparts there was no organizational pressure to create a doctrine simply to justify a separate air force. This permitted a wider appreciation of different air power roles.

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about the author

Major William (Bill) March graduating from the Royal Military College in 1982, underwent basic navigation training in Winnipeg, and then proceeded onto CP 140 Auroras, serving on 407 Mari­time Patrol and 404 Maritime Patrol and Training Squadrons. Posted to Royal Roads Col­lege in 1990 as a Squadron Commander, he was promoted the next year and assumed military training and administrative duties for the College. In 1993, he completed his Masters Degree at the University of Victoria and was selected to recreate the position of Air Force Historian at 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters for which he earned a Chief of the Air Staff Commendation. After Staff College in 1998, he filled a series of staff appointments at National Defence Head­quarters which culminated in working on unmanned air vehicles (UAVS) and intelligence, surveil­lance and reconnaissance (ISR) for the Air Force. In 1999, his work in promoting aviation history in Canada was recognized when he was presented with the Fred Hatch Award. Posted overseas in 2003, he worked as the principal Desk Officer for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Re­sponse Force activities of the Land Component Command Headquarters, Heidelberg, Germany. Returning to in 2006, he spent two years as the Concepts and Doctrine Development desk officer for UAVs and Space at the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre in Trenton, Ontario. Although he still involved with UAVs, his “day job” is that of the Academic Liaison Officer within the Strategic Aerospace Research, Assessment and Liaison Branch. to make the most of his spare time, in September 2006, he commenced studies towards a PhD in War Studies at the Royal Military College. Major march has a long-time interest in aerospace history in general and Canadian Air Force History in particular.