The “AEROGRAM”; our Latest Feature

Through the hard work of Howard G. Coombs, we now feature the AEROGRAM. The AEROGRAM is a collection of interesting and thought provoking links from around the world that would benefit to anyone interested in contemporary warfare studies.

PROJECTING POWER; TRENDS SHAPING CANADA’S AIR FORCE IN THE YEAR 2019

By
LCol Lachance, Project Director
LCol Fernandes, Author
Maj Gushue, Author
Dr. Godefroy, Editor

The next decade will prove critical to the Air Force’s objective of creating an advanced combat effective aerospace force capable of projecting power through precision effects. Given the nature of air power, air forces often require long lead times for developing new capabilities, especially those delivered from major aerospace platforms. Informed by Air Force Strategy as well as the vision of the Chief of Air Staff, Projecting Power: Trends Shaping Canada’s Air Force in the Year 2019 takes a detailed look at the short term future security environment—specifically the trends, drivers and strategic shocks—that will impact on existing and emerging Air Force concepts and doctrinal designs. Aimed at key stakeholders in Air Force capability development, this publication seeks to inform the Air Force Campaign Plan over the next 5–10 years and will be updated regularly as our requirements evolve

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Reflections and Questions on Ethics

By Major-General Marc Terreau, CMM, CD (Retired)

Ethics and integrity are not just fads, as some cynics would say. Humans have been debating virtuous behaviour and working for the good for at least 2500 years.1 Yet, we are often falling short of the good. Why is that?

Over the years I have dealt with leaders, great and poor, and observed ethical dilemmas played out in various settings. My observations have been primarily in the public sector including the Armed Forces as well as in the not-for-profit sector where I have worked with numerous organizations. I have also had the opportunity to work with certified fraud examiners in both the private and public sectors. This paper is not necessarily the summa of my journey in the field of applied ethics; rather it is a series of observations that have impacted my perception on how to do the right thing and do things right. In my involvement with organizations such as the Ethics Practitioners’ Association of
Canada2 and in establishing a formal ethics program in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, I have faced a number of important questions. Regrettably, I have not  always found suitable and useful answers to these questions. One can only do the best possible with what is available at the time.

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Different Shades of Blue: Interwar Air Power Doctrine Development Part 2: Air Power, Doctrine and the Anglo-American Approach

Introduction
This is the second in a series of two articles. Part I1 examined the emergence of aerospace doctrine between the wars and the Anglo-American approach to its development. This part looks at the same issue from the perspective of the United States (US) and Britain’s major aerospace  opponents during the war: Germany and Japan.

The German Approach Like England, Germany had ended World War I with a substantial body of air power experience across all possible roles and missions. In fact, German bombing missions against London led to the creation of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Although Germany, as a defeated nation, was
denied an air force by the Treaty of Versailles, this did not stop the development of air power doctrine. Under the guidance of Generaloberst Hans von Seeckt, the commander of the muchreduced
post-war army, Germany was the only major World War I combatant to undertake a systematic study of wartime aviation. Theycame to the conclusion that the first task for an air force would be to establish air superiority, after which missions in support of the army and against the enemy’s rear areas could be flown. These missions were primarily offensive in nature thus making the bomber the most important type of aircraft.2 German army doctrine focused a combined-arms approach to combat in which a mix of infantry, artillery, tanks, cavalry and aircraft were applied to the mission at hand. To provide air power input a small air staff provided the theoretical work while practical
considerations were explored at a secret base at Lipetsk in the Soviet Union. According to James Corum and Richard Muller, it was generally accepted that once Germany rearmed the Luftwaffe would be a separate service, while the air staff accepted as a matter of course that a large portion of the air force would be dedicated to supporting the army.3 Therefore, unlike their Anglo-American counterparts there was no organizational pressure to create a doctrine simply to justify a separate air force. This permitted a wider appreciation of different air power roles.

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about the author

Major William (Bill) March graduating from the Royal Military College in 1982, underwent basic navigation training in Winnipeg, and then proceeded onto CP 140 Auroras, serving on 407 Mari­time Patrol and 404 Maritime Patrol and Training Squadrons. Posted to Royal Roads Col­lege in 1990 as a Squadron Commander, he was promoted the next year and assumed military training and administrative duties for the College. In 1993, he completed his Masters Degree at the University of Victoria and was selected to recreate the position of Air Force Historian at 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters for which he earned a Chief of the Air Staff Commendation. After Staff College in 1998, he filled a series of staff appointments at National Defence Head­quarters which culminated in working on unmanned air vehicles (UAVS) and intelligence, surveil­lance and reconnaissance (ISR) for the Air Force. In 1999, his work in promoting aviation history in Canada was recognized when he was presented with the Fred Hatch Award. Posted overseas in 2003, he worked as the principal Desk Officer for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Re­sponse Force activities of the Land Component Command Headquarters, Heidelberg, Germany. Returning to in 2006, he spent two years as the Concepts and Doctrine Development desk officer for UAVs and Space at the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre in Trenton, Ontario. Although he still involved with UAVs, his “day job” is that of the Academic Liaison Officer within the Strategic Aerospace Research, Assessment and Liaison Branch. to make the most of his spare time, in September 2006, he commenced studies towards a PhD in War Studies at the Royal Military College. Major march has a long-time interest in aerospace history in general and Canadian Air Force History in particular.

The Wing Concept Revisited: The Adoption of Capability-based Wings

The Wing Concept Revisited: The Adoption of Capability-based Wings
as an Alternative to Groups
By Lieutenant-Colonel A. Lee Smith, CD

With the imminent creation of 2 Canadian Air Division, there are also strong rumours that the groups (which disappeared in 1997 when the Commander of Air Command [Chief of the Air Staff] moved from Winnipeg to Ottawa and 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters was resurrected) will be recreated. Having been at the forefront of the implementation of the wing concept1 in 1993 under LGen Huddleston, I have always been a supporter of that initiative and feel that it went a long way to reinvigorate the Air Force approach to operations. Nevertheless, there were aspects of the wing concept that bothered me at the time and, perhaps, now is the perfect time to re‑examine the concept as a possible alternative to bringing back the groups. I have always believed that a wing should be a fighting formation, made up of two or three squadrons (sqns) of identical aircraft (for example, 4 Wing Baden [pre-1993] consisted of three CF188 squadrons) or two or more squadrons of different aircraft that would fight together (for example, 366 Wing, Mountain Home Air Force Base [pre-2002] consisted of EF-111A, F-15C and B‑1B squadrons). The latter is commonly referred to as a composite wing. When the wing concept was instituted in Canada, most of our wings were composite wings, in that they were made up of disparate units; however, few of them met the definition of a fighting formation. A good example of this is 19 Wing where, at the time, there was a long-range patrol squadron (CP140), a combat support squadron (CT133) and a search and rescue squadron (CC115/CH113). This situation has not changed significantly over the intervening years and arguably has gotten worse due to the standing down of various units. 3 Wing and 4 Wing now only have one operational CF188 squadron each and 14 Wing has only one operational CP140 squadron. The reason that these composite wings existed is that, with the exception of 1 Wing and 12 Wing, they were geographically based. The Air Force had primarily taken the Canadian Forces base (CFB) structure and simply re‑clothed it as a wing.Perhaps, now is the time to re-evaluate this structure and possibly apply the 1 Wing and 12 Wing model to the remainder of our wings. This proposal would result in the creation of wings based on capability lines.

Future Casting; Imperfect Predictions

by Ralph Mercer

“Maybe somebody should’ve labelled the future “some assembly required”. Michael Garibaldi

When we set about the task of predicting what the Air Force of the future will look like, we can make some safe assumptions. Processors for computers will get more powerful and smaller, it will be come increasing cheap to produce and more pervasive in society. The interface between man and machine will improve, allowing us to interact and assimilate information faster than ever. Culturally we will become knowledge nomads, social networkers and sifters of information, taking snippets of news, information and entertainment from the Web and assembling it into our personal data stream.

The Challenge of the Automated Flight Deck

By Captain Tim Rawlings, 17 Wing Canadian Forces Air Navigation School

The original version of this paper, by Capt Tim Rawlings and (then) Capt Don Barnby, working in Air Force Training and Central Flying School  respectively, deserves much of the credit as the catalyst for the Air Force’s automation strategy. The Air Division aircraft automation philosophy has now been developed and published, and experienced outside assistance has been engaged and has already started visiting a number selected Wings and units to gain an understanding of our current policies, as well as observe our automation awareness and airmanship. The contractors who have been engaged have done similar
work with the United States Marine Corps and United States Coast Guard, and have ensured that those organizations’ tactical and operational
imperatives have been respected even as they changed themselves to exploit the capabilities of their automated cockpits. Following the development of appropriate pan-Air Force automation policies and
the amendment of our orders, the Air Force’s automation strategy will examine type-specific procedures and practices for our specific operations. It is important that the cascading nature of this change strategy be respected to ensure that when new standard operating procedures (SOPs) and checklists are re-published or amended, they
reflect and incorporate the overall philosophy and the new orders.
Our Air Force’s cascading top-down automation

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Capt Rawlings received his wings in October 1990 and earned his airline transport pilot licence in 1997. He has accumulated over 6,000 hours total time (military and civilian). He has flown the CH136 Kiowa
helicopter at 427 and 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron, and his fixed-wing time includes 2,500 hours on CT114 Tutor at 2 Canadian Forces Flying Training School and 431 (Air Defence) Squadron while 1,800
hours were logged on the Airbus 319/320/321 with Air Canada. Capt Rawlings is currently at 17 Wing Canadian Forces Air Navigation School flying the CT142 Dash-8. Other achievements and functions held include Deputy Commanding Officer, Flight Commander, Chief Standards Officer, A2 instructional category, and staff officer at Division HQ.

Air Commodore Leonard Birchall: Leadership in his own words

Preface by Major William March

Air Commodore Leonard Birchall was the epitome of an officer. During his 62 years of service, in peace and war, he demonstrated what a leader should be through his devotion to duty and willingness to put the safety and comfort of personel under his command ahead of his well being. Although his story has been told many times, it was a rare treat to hear him in person as he strove to impart practical lessons in leadership to generations of young airmen and airwomen. The article that follows is the transcript of one such speaking engagement. As such it provides a personal glimpse of an airman whose accomplishments were described by Major-General James R. Davies of the United States Marine Corps thusly: “In circumstances where only too many officers had failed to live up to their responsibilities, the tales of Birchall’s leadership carried … throughout the system of camps, brought renewed faith and strength to many hundreds of men. It is incredible how morale of disheartened men can rise behind the example of a courageous  officer, B irchall came to be something of a symbol, to stand in the hearts of men as a true officer.” Here then, in his own words, are the musings of a true officer.

more of the original article is found here more…..

A Fine Mess: How Our Tactical Helicopter Force Came To Be What It Is

By Col Randall Wakelam

It’s hard to disagree with the conclusions which Thierry Gongora and Slawomir Wesolkowski reach in their article1 on the Air Force’s tactical helicopter force: balanced it is not.  The nagging question which, however, remains unasked and unanswered is how did we come to be in this position?  The next few paragraphs are intended to shed some light on aviation doctrine and procurement decisions during the 1970s, 80s and 90s as I believe that this historical context is germane to understanding where we are today. Much of what follows is based on personal recollection and anecdotal history.
During the 1960s we had three categories of helicopters (here I will use the categories defined in the original article). Reconnaissance helicopters (CH112 Hiller Nomads) were operated by armoured regiments in what were called the “bubble troops.” The Royal Canadian Army Service Corps activated 1 Transport Helicopter Platoon and equipped it with light transport helicopters-the Vertol CH113 Voyageur. Finally, we purchased a squadron’s worth of CUH-1H (subsequent CH118) Iroquois utility helicopters and formed 403 Squadron as a precursor to bigger things to come. So we had three of four of the principal categories of tactical helicopters. As the 1970s advanced we replaced all three fleets with more up to date hardware in the form of the CH136 Kiowa reconnaissance helicopter, the CH147 Chinook medium transport helicopter and the CH135 Twin Huey utility helicopter.

Leadership: The Air Dimension

By Colonel William Lewis

There are very few disciplines that receive as much attention and study as leadership. However, in spite of the myriad of articles, books, motivational speakers and
courses on the subject, there is clearly not a universally accepted understanding of the scope, breadth, competencies and application of leadership. As explained by Bennis and Nanus, “Leadership competencies have remained constant throughout the years, but our understanding of what it is, how it works, and the ways in which people learn to apply it has changed over the past decades.”1 There have been many publications on leadership in a military context, but the majority of the writings and empirical research is focused on the United States Army or, more generically, from a land-based construct. Arguably, this focus on army leadership is due to the  profession of arms’ preoccupation with the “combat-warrior” image.2   For more on this article follow http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/cfawc/eLibrary/Journal/Vol2-2009/Iss1-Winter/Sections/04-Leadership-The_Air_Dimension_e.pdf

The Air Force Officer Development Program: What’s it all about?

By Major Jamie Davidson and Major Rainer Wosnitza

A program aimed at delivering the professional development education for officers of Canada’s Air Force is currently being developed. The Air Force Officer Development (AFOD) Program replaces the former Air Force Officer Basic Course and Air Force Officer Advanced Course. Unlike its predecessors, AFOD uses the blended learning methods of distance education and traditional in-house residential training. This is a new direction for professional development education for Air Command. Although the program is designed to develop Air Force officers, students quickly note that flexibility underpins the curriculum’s structure and application. AFOD is organized into five blocks. Block 1 is administered between initial classification training and the point where a junior officer reaches the operationally functional point (OFP). Although it may vary from one classification to another, the OFP occurs when a junior officer achieves occupational status during their first operational tour. Block 2, currently available, is optimally completed during the initial two years of an officer’s first  occupational posting. Block 3 and Block 4 material is tailored to meet the needs of officers approaching the end of their first tour and the beginning of their second tour. Block 5-the one and only residential component-is three-weeks in duration. Here, material learned through Blocks 1 to 4 is synthesized and applied during classroom instruction and practical exercises.  For more follow this link http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/cfawc/eLibrary/Journal/Vol2-2009/Iss1-Winter/Sections/11-The_Air_Force_Officer_Development_Program-Whats_it_All_About_e.pdf