The “AEROGRAM”; our Latest Feature

Through the hard work of Howard G. Coombs, we now feature the AEROGRAM. The AEROGRAM is a collection of interesting and thought provoking links from around the world that would benefit to anyone interested in contemporary warfare studies.

 For more information visit the CFAWC website at http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/CFAWC/Index_e.asp

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The Emergence of a “Doctrinal Culture” Within the Air Force Part 2

By Aaron P. Jackson

This is the second of two articles that examine the origin, evolution and future potential of the recent emergence of a tentative “doctrinal culture” within the Canadian Air Force. In the first article it was postulated that the culture of the Canadian Air Force, like most other Western air forces, has not been traditionally characterised by a tendency towards theoretical or doctrinal development. Instead, a strong oral (rather than
written) culture of passing lessons from senior to junior officers evolved early in the history of the Canadian Air Force and subsequently became entrenched. This was accompanied by a tendency to pragmatically focus on contemporary issues, to the detriment of broader theoretical and doctrinal development.1 Recently, however, there have been some indications that the Canadian Air Force is beginning to shift away from this cultural paradigm, and that a tentative culture of doctrinal development is emerging to take its place.
Drawing on the background provided in Part 1, this article examines the Canadian Air Force’s attempts to develop doctrine since the formation of Air Command in 1975. This examination is undertaken in three sections. First, limited doctrine development between 1975 and 1989 is briefly discussed. Second, doctrine
development during the 1990s is analysed in relation to the international rejuvenation of air power theory that occurred during that decade. Third, the apparent emergence of a tentative doctrinal culture within the Canadian Air Force during the past decade is considered. In conclusion, the future potential of this tentative
culture is addressed, and some challenges that remain to be overcome are highlighted.

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A Networked Vision

The list of challenges facing the Air Force is long; infrastructure, aircraft pro- curement, future security environments, recruiting and budgetary constraints, just to name a few. There is a common thread that underpins the search for solutions to all these serious problems. This common thread is the computer network that all Air Force personnel use; it is from this network that we source the solutions to the problems that affect us. We must question whether this network that supports all Air Force activities can provide the necessary know- ledge transfer, collaboration and flexibility necessary to generate the ideas and innovative solutions needed. Sadly, the answer to that question is no, we are quickly being left behind in network development and concepts.

There is a growing digital divide2 between the collaborative, innovative and user friendly networks available to the public and our rigid outdated military net- works. If this capability gap is not addressed we will not be able to use or exploit future advances in computer network applications, technologies or innovations. Air Force personnel work in a network environment that boasts email saturation and no formal knowledge capture system or useful search engine. In the name of security we have disabled the majority of our programs and communication devices to the point of rendering them useless. The fallout from this one-size-fits- all network is the creation of virtual and cerebral information silos.

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The role of Air Power by Air Commodore KLB Hodson 1955

Air power used to be a provocative and controversial subject. In its beginnings, its advocates violently overstated their case in a deliberate and sometimes successful attempt to attract the support necessary to allow air forces to demonstrate their abilities. Latterly, of course, nuclear weapons have given air power such a fantastic capability as to incite public apprehension and horror, and certainly to provoke wide-spread interest. Since nuclear weapons dominate the military and political scene, any general discussion of the roles of the Armed Services must be based on an examination of the weapon itself. I propose thereforeto start with a brief discussion of the effects of the advent
of nuclear weapons, and to develop from there the type of tasks that air forces may be called upon to play.
The principal weapon of an air force is, of course, the bomb. The airman has always believed that he could force a decision by strategic bombardment. In World War II, which was the first

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16th annual Air Force Historical Workshop

Canada’s north has been a focus of Air Force operations since the interwar period. The purpose of this workshop is to explore the historical dimension of the Air Force’s involvement in the Arctic. Topics may examine Air Force / government policy, Air Force operations, joint operations, relationships with our allies, search and rescue, Arctic disputes, civil-military relationships, environmental issues, and others. Individuals interested in presenting a paper should forward a short one- or two-paragraph proposal to Major Bill March prior to 1 January 2010. Notification of selection will be provided by 16 January 2010. Proceedings will be published.

Full details link here http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/cfawc/Documents/16th_Annual_AF_Historical_Workshop-Call_For_Papers.pdf

The emergence of “Doctrinal Culture” within the Air Force part 1

In a paper published in 2002, Canadian Air Force officer Paul Johnston asserted that “[i]t has been widely observed that air forces are usually not as keen on doctrine as armies tend to be, and the Canadian Forces are certainly no exception to this rule.”1 In the same year, Aerospace Doctrine Study: Final Report reached a similar conclusion: “Historically the Canadian air force has been weak in doctrinal development; very little original, independent air force…doctrine has been written.” As discussion herein will postulate, the culture of the Canadian Air Force, like most other Western air forces, has not been traditionally characterised by a tendency towards theoretical or doctrinal development. Instead, an oral (rather than written) culture of passing lessons from senior to junior officers evolved early in the history of the Canadian Air Force and subsequently became entrenched. This was accompanied by a tendency to pragmatically focus on contemporary issues, to the detriment of broader theoretical and doctrinal development. Among the small number of studies that have hitherto been undertaken in an effort to explain why such a culture has developed within other air forces, Robert Futrell’s study of United States Air Force (USAF) culture is probably the best known. Futrell suggested that from the outset, the nature of air forces tended to attract people with an “active” rather than a “literary” focus. During the early years of their existence, when air force culture was still emerging, the heavy criticism early air power theorists attracted (especially from within armies and navies) greatly exacerbated the existing propensity of most airmen to eschew written theories and doctrines

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PROJECTING POWER; TRENDS SHAPING CANADA’S AIR FORCE IN THE YEAR 2019

By
LCol Lachance, Project Director
LCol Fernandes, Author
Maj Gushue, Author
Dr. Godefroy, Editor

The next decade will prove critical to the Air Force’s objective of creating an advanced combat effective aerospace force capable of projecting power through precision effects. Given the nature of air power, air forces often require long lead times for developing new capabilities, especially those delivered from major aerospace platforms. Informed by Air Force Strategy as well as the vision of the Chief of Air Staff, Projecting Power: Trends Shaping Canada’s Air Force in the Year 2019 takes a detailed look at the short term future security environment—specifically the trends, drivers and strategic shocks—that will impact on existing and emerging Air Force concepts and doctrinal designs. Aimed at key stakeholders in Air Force capability development, this publication seeks to inform the Air Force Campaign Plan over the next 5–10 years and will be updated regularly as our requirements evolve

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Reflections and Questions on Ethics

By Major-General Marc Terreau, CMM, CD (Retired)

Ethics and integrity are not just fads, as some cynics would say. Humans have been debating virtuous behaviour and working for the good for at least 2500 years.1 Yet, we are often falling short of the good. Why is that?

Over the years I have dealt with leaders, great and poor, and observed ethical dilemmas played out in various settings. My observations have been primarily in the public sector including the Armed Forces as well as in the not-for-profit sector where I have worked with numerous organizations. I have also had the opportunity to work with certified fraud examiners in both the private and public sectors. This paper is not necessarily the summa of my journey in the field of applied ethics; rather it is a series of observations that have impacted my perception on how to do the right thing and do things right. In my involvement with organizations such as the Ethics Practitioners’ Association of
Canada2 and in establishing a formal ethics program in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, I have faced a number of important questions. Regrettably, I have not  always found suitable and useful answers to these questions. One can only do the best possible with what is available at the time.

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Different Shades of Blue: Interwar Air Power Doctrine Development Part 2: Air Power, Doctrine and the Anglo-American Approach

Introduction
This is the second in a series of two articles. Part I1 examined the emergence of aerospace doctrine between the wars and the Anglo-American approach to its development. This part looks at the same issue from the perspective of the United States (US) and Britain’s major aerospace  opponents during the war: Germany and Japan.

The German Approach Like England, Germany had ended World War I with a substantial body of air power experience across all possible roles and missions. In fact, German bombing missions against London led to the creation of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Although Germany, as a defeated nation, was
denied an air force by the Treaty of Versailles, this did not stop the development of air power doctrine. Under the guidance of Generaloberst Hans von Seeckt, the commander of the muchreduced
post-war army, Germany was the only major World War I combatant to undertake a systematic study of wartime aviation. Theycame to the conclusion that the first task for an air force would be to establish air superiority, after which missions in support of the army and against the enemy’s rear areas could be flown. These missions were primarily offensive in nature thus making the bomber the most important type of aircraft.2 German army doctrine focused a combined-arms approach to combat in which a mix of infantry, artillery, tanks, cavalry and aircraft were applied to the mission at hand. To provide air power input a small air staff provided the theoretical work while practical
considerations were explored at a secret base at Lipetsk in the Soviet Union. According to James Corum and Richard Muller, it was generally accepted that once Germany rearmed the Luftwaffe would be a separate service, while the air staff accepted as a matter of course that a large portion of the air force would be dedicated to supporting the army.3 Therefore, unlike their Anglo-American counterparts there was no organizational pressure to create a doctrine simply to justify a separate air force. This permitted a wider appreciation of different air power roles.

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about the author

Major William (Bill) March graduating from the Royal Military College in 1982, underwent basic navigation training in Winnipeg, and then proceeded onto CP 140 Auroras, serving on 407 Mari­time Patrol and 404 Maritime Patrol and Training Squadrons. Posted to Royal Roads Col­lege in 1990 as a Squadron Commander, he was promoted the next year and assumed military training and administrative duties for the College. In 1993, he completed his Masters Degree at the University of Victoria and was selected to recreate the position of Air Force Historian at 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters for which he earned a Chief of the Air Staff Commendation. After Staff College in 1998, he filled a series of staff appointments at National Defence Head­quarters which culminated in working on unmanned air vehicles (UAVS) and intelligence, surveil­lance and reconnaissance (ISR) for the Air Force. In 1999, his work in promoting aviation history in Canada was recognized when he was presented with the Fred Hatch Award. Posted overseas in 2003, he worked as the principal Desk Officer for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Re­sponse Force activities of the Land Component Command Headquarters, Heidelberg, Germany. Returning to in 2006, he spent two years as the Concepts and Doctrine Development desk officer for UAVs and Space at the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre in Trenton, Ontario. Although he still involved with UAVs, his “day job” is that of the Academic Liaison Officer within the Strategic Aerospace Research, Assessment and Liaison Branch. to make the most of his spare time, in September 2006, he commenced studies towards a PhD in War Studies at the Royal Military College. Major march has a long-time interest in aerospace history in general and Canadian Air Force History in particular.

The Wing Concept Revisited: The Adoption of Capability-based Wings

The Wing Concept Revisited: The Adoption of Capability-based Wings
as an Alternative to Groups
By Lieutenant-Colonel A. Lee Smith, CD

With the imminent creation of 2 Canadian Air Division, there are also strong rumours that the groups (which disappeared in 1997 when the Commander of Air Command [Chief of the Air Staff] moved from Winnipeg to Ottawa and 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters was resurrected) will be recreated. Having been at the forefront of the implementation of the wing concept1 in 1993 under LGen Huddleston, I have always been a supporter of that initiative and feel that it went a long way to reinvigorate the Air Force approach to operations. Nevertheless, there were aspects of the wing concept that bothered me at the time and, perhaps, now is the perfect time to re‑examine the concept as a possible alternative to bringing back the groups. I have always believed that a wing should be a fighting formation, made up of two or three squadrons (sqns) of identical aircraft (for example, 4 Wing Baden [pre-1993] consisted of three CF188 squadrons) or two or more squadrons of different aircraft that would fight together (for example, 366 Wing, Mountain Home Air Force Base [pre-2002] consisted of EF-111A, F-15C and B‑1B squadrons). The latter is commonly referred to as a composite wing. When the wing concept was instituted in Canada, most of our wings were composite wings, in that they were made up of disparate units; however, few of them met the definition of a fighting formation. A good example of this is 19 Wing where, at the time, there was a long-range patrol squadron (CP140), a combat support squadron (CT133) and a search and rescue squadron (CC115/CH113). This situation has not changed significantly over the intervening years and arguably has gotten worse due to the standing down of various units. 3 Wing and 4 Wing now only have one operational CF188 squadron each and 14 Wing has only one operational CP140 squadron. The reason that these composite wings existed is that, with the exception of 1 Wing and 12 Wing, they were geographically based. The Air Force had primarily taken the Canadian Forces base (CFB) structure and simply re‑clothed it as a wing.Perhaps, now is the time to re-evaluate this structure and possibly apply the 1 Wing and 12 Wing model to the remainder of our wings. This proposal would result in the creation of wings based on capability lines.

The Challenge of the Automated Flight Deck

By Captain Tim Rawlings, 17 Wing Canadian Forces Air Navigation School

The original version of this paper, by Capt Tim Rawlings and (then) Capt Don Barnby, working in Air Force Training and Central Flying School  respectively, deserves much of the credit as the catalyst for the Air Force’s automation strategy. The Air Division aircraft automation philosophy has now been developed and published, and experienced outside assistance has been engaged and has already started visiting a number selected Wings and units to gain an understanding of our current policies, as well as observe our automation awareness and airmanship. The contractors who have been engaged have done similar
work with the United States Marine Corps and United States Coast Guard, and have ensured that those organizations’ tactical and operational
imperatives have been respected even as they changed themselves to exploit the capabilities of their automated cockpits. Following the development of appropriate pan-Air Force automation policies and
the amendment of our orders, the Air Force’s automation strategy will examine type-specific procedures and practices for our specific operations. It is important that the cascading nature of this change strategy be respected to ensure that when new standard operating procedures (SOPs) and checklists are re-published or amended, they
reflect and incorporate the overall philosophy and the new orders.
Our Air Force’s cascading top-down automation

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Capt Rawlings received his wings in October 1990 and earned his airline transport pilot licence in 1997. He has accumulated over 6,000 hours total time (military and civilian). He has flown the CH136 Kiowa
helicopter at 427 and 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron, and his fixed-wing time includes 2,500 hours on CT114 Tutor at 2 Canadian Forces Flying Training School and 431 (Air Defence) Squadron while 1,800
hours were logged on the Airbus 319/320/321 with Air Canada. Capt Rawlings is currently at 17 Wing Canadian Forces Air Navigation School flying the CT142 Dash-8. Other achievements and functions held include Deputy Commanding Officer, Flight Commander, Chief Standards Officer, A2 instructional category, and staff officer at Division HQ.